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The multiple detections of gravitational waves by LIGO (the Laser Interferometer Gravitational-Wave
Observatory), operated by Caltech and MIT, have been acclaimed as conﬁrming Einstein's prediction, a
century ago, that gravitational waves propagating as ripples in spacetime would be detected. Yunes and
Pretorius (2009) investigate whether LIGO's template-based searches encode fundamental assumptions,
especially the assumption that the background theory of general relativity is an accurate description of
the phenomena detected in the search. They construct the parametrized post-Einsteinian (ppE) frame-
work in response, which broadens those assumptions and allows for wider testing under more ﬂexible
assumptions. Their methods are consistent with work on conﬁrmation and testing found in Carnap
(1936), Hempel (1969), and Stein (1992, 1994), with the following principles in common: that conﬁr-
mation is distinct from testing, and that, counterintuitively, revising a theory's formal basis can make it
more broadly empirically testable. These views encourage a method according to which theories can be
made abstract, to deﬁne families of general structures for the purpose of testing. With the development
of the ppE framework and related approaches, multi-messenger astronomy is a catalyst for deep
reasoning about the limits and potential of the theoretical framework of general relativity.
© 2020 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Theory dependence and theory testing
The recent exciting results in gravitational wave astronomy
present novel challenges to philosophical accounts of theory
testing.1 The results promise to open new avenues of research. They
will do so not just by racking up new detections, but by allowing
researchers to formulate what Karl Popper called “interesting
problems”, problems that put the claims of a theory in jeopardy.2
The results of the “detection” of gravitational waves are cited as
“conﬁrmation” of the predictions of general relativity. Suh discov-
eries are exciting, not just because of the results they conﬁrm, but
also because of the new doors for research and testing that they
open. It is just as important to ﬁnd ways to put a theory to the testtional wave astronomy up to
observations which I have in
ledge, but the repeated over-
y better or more satisfactory
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lems that are hard cases for a
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td. This is an open access article u
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rg/10.1016/j.shpsb.2020.01.00as it is to conﬁrm that theory. General relativity is not the only
candidate theory of gravitation: scalar tensor theories, Brans-Dicke
theory, massive graviton theory, Chern-Simons modiﬁed gravity,
Einstein-Aether theory, MOND, TeVes, and DGP theory have all
been proposed as alternatives to classical GR. It would be inter-
esting, and scientiﬁcally productive, if the new events being
detected could be cited as evidence for or against these theories.3
Still, any testing-based methodology comes with a challenge.
The method of testing must be such that one can make logical, well
founded inferences from tests of a theory to possible means of
strengthening that theory. If our goal is to identify how a theory
should be tested, and exactly which changes are warranted
following testing, that will require identifying which of the hy-
potheses of that theory may be erroneous. It also requires ﬁnding a
way to control testing of the theory: by showing which proposi-
tions of the background theory are independent of each other, for
instance. That requires formal proofs of consistency and indepen-
dence within axiomatized systems. The question of whether a3 Yunes and Pretorius 2009, Appendix A and Baker et al. 2017 are among recent
papers drawing conclusions from the LIGO results about how to decide which
among these theories are ruled out, and which is still viable.
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pothesis of a theory is particulary crucial in gravitational wave as-
tronomy. The methods of detection of gravitational waves require
ﬁrst constructing models of “candidate” waveforms, waveforms
that are hypothesized to have the properties of the ones detected.
These waveforms are used in computer simulations, which are in
turn used for matched ﬁltering of the signal. In practice, it does not
seem possible to isolate any one hypothesis involved in gravita-
tional wave modeling from any other. This is a problem, from the
perspective of testing.
Philosophers of science will by now recognize another problem,
to do with more well known forms of theory dependence in
modeling. The fundamental claim at issue is whether the model
being used is properly speciﬁed for the data under analysis. If a data
model4 assumes that the data modeled are independent and
identically distributed (IID), but there is a trend in the data,
regression analysis will not reveal the discrepancy, because the
analysis itself has been formulated using a mis-speciﬁed model.5
Similarly, if a dynamical model using differential equations as-
sumes that the underlying phenomenon has a certain structure, it
may or may not be possible to detect discrepancies from that
assumption in testing. For instance, if a ﬂuid model works on the
assumption that the ﬂuid is continuous, and the instruments used
are not sensitive enough to detect or measure discontinuity, then
those discrepancies (the actual granularity of the ﬂuid) will not be
detected in testing. This may or may not be signiﬁcant, depending
on the theory that is under investigation.
On the one hand, testing a theory requires ﬁnding tight logical
connections between its abstract elements, so that researchers can
identify weak hypotheses and claims, and can draw justiﬁed con-
clusions about how to revise a theory in the face of experimental
ﬁndings in conﬂict with its claims. On the other hand, ﬁnding what
Popper calls “interesting problems” that put the theory under strain
may involve a more ﬂexible approach. When searching for new
ways to test a theory, it is crucial to consider, hypothetically, mul-
tiple ways the theory could be incorrect, and to identify the distinct
ways the theory's claims could fail. That requires doing formal
reasoning, not just about how to conﬁrm the theory, but about how
to show that it is wrong and exactly why.
The discussion below will demonstrate that the recent de-
tections of gravitational waves can broaden the platform that
gravitational wave astronomy provides for future theory testing
and inference. The analysis below sketches one proposal for how
this can be done, from Nicolas Yunes and Frans Pretorius, and
provides a philosophical evaluation with a focus on theory testing
and the growth of experimental knowledge. I will argue that a
Carnapian tradition, represented by Howard Stein, Carl Hempel,
and Carnap himself, provides a ﬂexible account of theory testing
and conﬁrmation, and of the formal analysis of language and evi-
dence, that makes it possible to widen a theory's empirical
framework for testing.6 Deborah Mayo's work on statistical inference takes an approach focused on
testing, but focuses on severe tests as criteria for rigorous learning through
experimentation (Mayo, 2018). See (Spanos, 2011 and spa), and, of course, (Popper
1935, 1989).
7 Here see especially Mayo, 2018 and Mayo, 1996.
81.1. Theory testing and conﬁrmation
Logical relationships between elements of theoretical and
observational vocabularies are fundamental to theory conﬁrmation
and testing. In order to assess whether a given experiment is a
rigorous or ‘severe’ test of a theory, we might make certain4 Here, in the sense of a model like the Normal/Gaussian distribution, the Ber-
noulli model, and so on. See Suppes 1966.
5 Spanos and McGuirk have given a detailed analysis of “mis-speciﬁcation
testing,” which is a set of tests designed to detect which of a family of formal
models is appropriate to the data under analysis (Spanos & McGuirk, 2001).
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and type II error, for instance.6 Obtaining a clear deﬁnition of what
it means to ‘test’ a theory is difﬁcult, and it is even more difﬁcult to
distinguish conﬁrmation (ﬁnding empirical instances that support
a theory's claims) from testing (subjecting the theory to severe
tests, i.e., to tests that the theory's hypotheses would fail if they
were false)7.
A most elegant analysis of the relation between theory, conﬁr-
mation, and evidence is found in thework of Rudolf Carnap (Carnap
1936, 1988). Carnap made the problem appear clearly. But Carnap
often is thought to have placed unduly stringent restrictions on the
formulation of theoretical and observational vocabularies, and
especially on the relations between the two.8 Supposedly, the
reduction of theoretical to observation sentences in (Carnap, 1936)
requires ﬁrst specifying universal relationships between theoretical
and observational vocabularies. But this, as almost every major
ﬁgure in the history of philosophy of science has observed, would
be too strong (Stein,1994; Hempel 1969, and so on). For example, as
we will see in detail below, there is no general way to relate the
equations of general relativity to the “observational vocabulary” of
LIGO interferometry.
Thus, the focus increasingly comes to be on the question of how
narrower and broader languages are related to one another to
construct evidentiary relationships. In his early work, Carnap
argued for relations between theoretical and observation lan-
guages, which allowed for the reduction of one to the other, and in
turn for sentences in one to conﬁrm sentences in the other. Hempel
identiﬁes a problem with this: it makes the languages of science
seem as if they are entirely separate, when they are not. He
observes.
The assumption, in the standard construal, of an axiomatized
uninterpreted calculus as a constituent of a theory seems to me,
moreover, to obscure certain important characteristics shared
by many scientiﬁc theories. For that assumption suggests that
the basic principles of a theory e those corresponding to the
calculus e are formulated exclusively by means of a ‘new’
theoretical vocabulary, whose terms would be replaced by var-
iables or by dummy constants in the axiomatized calculus C. In
this case, the conjunction of the postulates of C would be an
expression of the type fðt1; t2;…; tnÞ, formed from the theo-
retical terms by means of logical symbols alone (Hempel 1969,
p. 153).
Hempel observes that the theoretical terms are not really
formed by stipulation in many cases. Rather, the previous theories
inform the choice of variables, laws, concepts, structural elements,
and explanations in the new theories. To Hempel, ‘new’ theories are
not entirely new. The “theoretical scenario” in which theoretical
terms and concepts are embedded is populated with terms that are
interpreted using scientiﬁc knowledge and know-how accumu-
lated before the new theorywas conceived. Hempel calls this a ‘pre-Despite well known criticisms of Carnap and of the logical empiricists on this
score, there have always been those willing to see much of value in Carnap's
approach. Richardson, 1998, Stein, 1994, Stein, 1992, Friedman, 1979 and even, to an
extent, Glymour, 1975 and Glymour, 1980 can be read as in support of a broadly
Carnappian framework. More recently, Lutz (Lutz 2012, 2017) provides stalwart
defenses of the received view, backed up by some of the remarks in the intro-
duction to Ott & Patton, 2018; an extensive yet sympathetic revision and recon-
struction of the account was done by Dutilh Novaes and Reck 2017.
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“totally uninterpreted system” other than the new theoretical
terms and logical andmathematical symbols (Hempel 1969, p.153).
Instead, the new theoretical vocabulary is interpreted using the
“pre-theoretical vocabulary” that deﬁnes, e.g., “masses, volumes,
velocities, momenta, and kinetic energies” (Hempel 1969, p. 153).
Hempel introduces a set of three vocabularies: theoretical,
observational, and ‘pre-theoretical’. His ‘pre-theoretical’ vocabulary
is not limited to observation terms: terms and sentences describing
wavelength, frequency, and so on are used to construct the ‘internal
principles’ of a new theory developed about a related, but distinct
subject matter. Like Imre Lakatos at around the same time, Hempel
aims to “rationalize” “classical conventionalism” (Lakatos, 1970, p.
134). It is entirely possible within classical conventionalism to use
previously gained knowledge as a constraint on, or even as a
constitutive, rational basis for, the postulation of new internal
principles of a theory.
Hempel's target is the position that “new” scientiﬁc theories
begin from a blank slate of uninterpreted theoretical terms, logical
and mathematical symbols, and ﬁll in all the empirically mean-
ingful ‘slots' with novel theoretical concepts. It appears clear that
Hempel's target was Carnap in particular.9 In Carnap (1934), Carnap
(1956), and other texts, Carnap provides a logical analysis of sci-
entiﬁc language, resulting in a view that Friedman recently has
called “structuralism without metaphysics” (Friedman (2011)).
According to Carnap's account in the “Methodological Char-
acter” essay, only the observational terms of a scientiﬁc theory
are semantically interpreted (by specifying observable proper-
ties and relations as their designata). The theoretical terms, by
contrast, are semantically uninterpreted, and are only implicitly
deﬁned, in the sense of Hilbert, by the axioms and postulates of
the relevant theory (e.g., Maxwell's equations for the electro-
magnetic ﬁeld). Among these axioms and postulates, however,
are mixed sentences or correspondence rules, which set up
(lawlike) relationships among theoretical and observational
terms; and, in this way, the theoretical terms and sentences
receive a partial interpretation in terms of the connections they
induce among observables. For example, Maxwell's equations,
in the presence of suitable correspondence rules relating values
of the electromagnetic ﬁeld to actual measurements (of electric
and magnetic intensities, and the like), generate observable
predictions and thus have empirical content (Friedman (2011),
pp. 253e4).
Along Hilbert's lines, and as late as 1956, Carnap takes the po-
sition that theories are frameworks or “scaffoldings” (Hilbert's
term), which can given multiple interpretations. The theoretical
terms, however, are not interpreted. Carnap writes, in response to
Hempel's criticisms here and elsewhere,
I agree with Hempel that the Ramsey-sentence does indeed
refer to theoretical entities by the use of abstract variables.
However, it should be noted that these entities are not unob-
servable physical objects like atoms, electrons, etc., but rather
(at least in the form of the language which I have chosen in
Carnap (1956)) purely logical-mathematical entities, e.g., natu-
ral numbers, classes of such, classes of classes, etc. Nevertheless
it is obviously a factual sentence. It says that the observable
events in the world are such that there are numbers, classes of
such, etc., which are correlated with the events in a prescribed9 See the related discussion of Hempel's “Theoretician's Dilemma” and Carnap's
response, in Friedman (2011).
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this assertion is clearly a factual statement about the world
(Carnap (1963), p. 963).
Hempel argues, against this view, that there can be no re-
statement of theoretical claims so that theoretical variables are
entirely uninterpreted. In order to understand how a physical
equation (say, Hooke's law or the ideal gas law) works, we need to
have a ‘pre-theoretical’ understanding of terms like ‘mass', ‘vol-
ume’, or ‘pressure’. These terms encode, not only logical and
mathematical symbols and relationships, but accumulated empir-
ical knowledge. Hempel thus argues that theoretical vocabularies
and concrete empirical interpretations of theories can't be disen-
tangled as neatly as Carnap and Hilbert think they can.
Carnap himself (Carnap (1963)) was appreciative of Hempel's
view on this matter. Similarly, I will concede to Hempel (for the
sake of argument) that, when we are accounting for how a theory
works to generate concrete explanations of phenomena, we cannot
consider theoretical terms to be uninterpreted logical and mathe-
matical symbols. In practice, it is necessary to use theories as sys-
tems of, not only symbols, but also accumulated empirical
knowledge and know-how that constrains the application of those
symbols.
If that previously gained knowledge is to inform future theory
testing, however, there must be some logical framework within
which we can locate the inferences drawn in theory testing and
assessment. For instance, if we reason that all future physical the-
ories in some domain must respect a measured physical parameter,
that is, if the parameter must serve as a constraint on theories in
that domain, we need a way to specify how the constraint will
work. Which other measurements or quantities within the theory,
for instance, will be affected? It is not possible simply to state that
the parameter will serve as a constraint; one must specify how, in
practice, the constraint will function, and what it will affect.
The earlier debate over Carnap's theoretical and observational
languages turns, in this strain of work, into an analysis of how
theoretical and observational vocabularies develop over time, and,
in particular, how theoretical vocabularies and observational vo-
cabularies are embedded within each other: not just observation
within theory, but theory within theory, and observation within
theory within theory. A previous (or rival) theory contains, not only
an observational vocabulary, but internal principles or axioms of its
own. Principles, laws, and deﬁnitions described the phenomena of
the ‘old’ theory and constrained our analysis of them. From the
viewpoint of a structural analysis, this means that we know what
the phenomena are in the classical theory: we know what classical
kinetic energy is, for instance, and what classical electron spin is.
But when those concepts are imported into a ‘new’ theory - the
quantum theory, for instance - theymay undergo radical revision.10
The incorporation of these terms of the ‘pre-theoretical’ - classical -
language into the new quantum theory was like an experiment:
how much of the ‘old’ theory can we incorporate without
encountering anomalies and falsiﬁcations?
We can concede Hempel's point, but also recognize that, when
we are considering the testing of a theory rather than its applica-
tion, we are pushed to deﬁne theoretical terms increasingly
formally in order to specify the abstract relationships that hold
between terms, relations, and structures within the theory. This is
true even if, in practice, the values of those terms must be con-
strained by evidence gained from empirical observation. Empirical10 See Salmon 1998, Büttner, Renn, & Schemmel, 2003, Patton, 2015, Kragh, 2012,
and many more.
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and that variable can still be uninterpreted if it is speciﬁed
conventionally.11
From a testing standpoint, there is potential in the Carnapian-
Hempelian approach. As Popper emphasized, formal, logical re-
lationships must be constructed in order to determine whether
hypotheses are independent from one another, in order to identify
the ‘weak’ premises of a model or theory. The Carnapian approach
goes beyond this: If we look at theories as determining, not just
classes of models as in the semantic view, but classes of languages
including formal rules of inference, we can ﬁnd ﬂexible ways to
control the testing of the theory, and to assess the empirical sig-
niﬁcance of a theory's claims (see Lutz, 2017 on empirical
signiﬁcance).1.2. Stein on the theory-observation distinction
Howard Stein is well known for giving new life to the study of
Isaac Newton. His work on Carnap is famous as well. Still, its po-
tential remains untapped, and it is one of my aims for this paper to
sketch a way that the new work on Carnap, much of which is
indebted to Stein, can and should shape philosophy of science in
the future. The account below will focus on “Some Reﬂections on
the Structure of Our Knowledge in Physics” (Stein, 1994). Stein
begins by revisiting Carnap's distinction between theoretical and
observational languages.
My own view is that in the rough sense Carnap was willing to
adopt from the time he abandoned the more primitive versions
of the empiricist thesis, there is no great difﬁculty in deﬁning an
“observational” vocabulary: an “observation-language” in Car-
nap's sense is the language in which we ordinarily conduct the
business of daily life, and the only theory it is dependent upon is
the theory that there are ordinary objects with such properties
as we habitually ascribe to them. There are also systems of
concepts of the sort that constitute the framework of funda-
mental physical theories; so, referring again to my example, I
may say that a book like Raum Zeit Materie [by Hermann
Weyl] demonstrates the existence of theoretical vocabularies
distinct from the observational. Thus I argue, on the basis of
these crude and banal considerations, that Carnap was right to
make and to emphasize this distinction. I also believe that his
philosophic career consists to a considerable degree in a series
of genuinely instructive attempts to do better justice to the
character of the distinction (Stein, 1994, p. 638).
Stein goes on to identify a speciﬁc difﬁculty:
But I think too that therewas a fundamental bar to success along
any of the routes Carnap essayed. For he always assumed that
“the observation language” is more restricted than, and included
in, a total language that includes an observational part and a
theoretical part, connected by deductive logical relations. And
this, I think e I do not say by virtue of some basic principle I can
identify, but simply, at the present time, de facto e is not the
case: there is no department of fundamental physics in which it
is possible, in the strict sense, to deduce observations, or
observable facts, from data and theory. So I suggest that the
principal difﬁculty is not that of how to leave the theory outside
the laboratory door, but that of how to get the laboratory inside
the theory (Stein, 1994, p. 638).11 If we say “Let height h range between 2 and 4 feet”, for instance, h is not
“interpreted” in the semantic sense just because it has empirical ‘content’.
Please cite this article as: Patton, L., Expanding theory testing in genera
Philosophy of Modern Physics, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsb.2020.01.00Stein argues that the fundamental problem is that there is no
straightforward relation between two vocabularies, observational
and theoretical, that allows for the reduction of one to the other, or
the deduction of one from the other.
Stein makes the following claims:
1. In many cases, we do not know how to deduce observations
from theory.
2. There, we cannot employ Carnap's distinction between theo-
retical and observational vocabularies to “reduce” one to the
other in order to construct a conﬁrmation relation.
3. Moreover, we cannot construct a language in which a more
restricted observational vocabulary is contained within a uni-
versal theoretical vocabulary, which will capture all the infer-
ential relations necessary to theory conﬁrmation and testing.
4. Thus, it is not that Carnap was wrong to make the distinction
between theoretical and observational vocabularies, but that he
was not able to show that that distinction was supported by an
embedding of a restricted observation language within a uni-
versal theoretical language.
Here Stein makes a surprising move. He argues that demon-
strating the links between observational and theoretical vocabu-
laries requires increased clarity at the level of the theoretical.
“Getting the laboratory inside the theory,” as he puts it, requires
going back to Carnap's “ﬁrst volume”: the axiomatic or law-
governed ﬁrst principles of a theory. Stein uses Newtonian clas-
sical mechanics as an example: Newtonian rational mechanics still
is a progressive research program, even as Newtonian classical
mechanics has been recognized to be less accurate than relativity
and the quantum theory in certain regimes. We need not accept a
strict distinction between theoretical and observational vocabu-
laries to accept that progress in “purely mathematical theory” may
go on even when removed from its physical application - or to
accept that that purely mathematical theory may in turn be
embedded in another empirical theory later, or in a plurality of
empirical theories (Stein, 1994, p. 650).
Erik Curiel (Curiel, 2020) identiﬁes a framework for showing
how theoretical and experimental data relate to one another,
explicitly inspired by Stein's urging to get “the laboratory inside the
theory”. The common thread of these approaches is the refusal to
collapse the languages that Hempel so carefully teased apart: the
theoretical, the observational, and the pre-theoretical. Curiel makes
several distinctions that will be crucial in what follows.
The template in a framework for equations of motion and other
mathematical relations I call abstract. Canonical examples are
Newton's Second Law, the Schr€odinger equation in non-
relativistic quantum mechanics, and so on. Structure and en-
tities at the highest level of a theory formulated in a given
framework I will call generic. In particular, generic structure has
no deﬁnite values for those quantities that appear as constants
in the theory's equations of motion and other mathematical
relations. The symbol ‘k’ appearing in the generic equation of
motion of an elastic spring modeled as a simple harmonic
oscillator, €x ¼  kmx , denotes Hooke's constant (the coefﬁcient of
proportionality of a force applied to the spring and the resulting
diplacement from its equilibrium position), but possesses no
ﬁxed value, and the same for the massm… One obtains specific
structure by ﬁxing the values of all such constants in generic
structure, say m ¼ 1 and k ¼ 5 (in some system of units) for the
elastic spring. This deﬁnes a species of physical system of that
genus, all springs with those values for mass and Hooke's con-
stant. One now has a determinate space of states for systems ofl relativity: LIGO and parametrized theories, Studies in History and
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evolutions, viz., the solutions to the speciﬁc equations of motion,
represented by a distinguished family of paths on the space of
states (Curiel, 2020, x7).
Once the family of possible physical systems has been identiﬁed,
one can begin to look for family members. These will come in the
form of “a concrete model”: “a collection of experimentally or
observationally gathered results structured and interpreted in such
a way as to allow identiﬁcation with an individual model” (Curiel,
2020, x7). The signiﬁcant point here is that the identiﬁcation be-
tween concrete and individual models “embodies the substantive
contact between theory and experiment required to comprehend
the full epistemic content of a theory” (Curiel, 2020). But this
identiﬁcation itself has nothing to do with experiment. It is an
identiﬁcation between elements of two distinct languages. That is
emphatically not to say that these two languages must be explicitly
set up before anymeaningful empirical content can be found. But, if
we are to understand the empirical content or signiﬁcance of a
theory fully, we must know whether the terms, concepts, propo-
sitions, and models we are using are abstract, generic, concrete, or
individual, and we must have the tools needed to make justiﬁed
comparisons between elements of these distinct classes.
The parametrized versions of the theory of general relativity
that we will discuss below are explicitly intended to identify which
parts of the theory are abstract, which generic, which concrete, and
how they work together in elaborating and testing the theory. The
example of LIGO is an excellent way to cash out what Stein and
Curiel mean by getting “the laboratory inside the theory”.12 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pressing clariﬁcation on this point.2. The LIGO results as tests of general relativity
The detection of gravitational waves by the LIGO (Laser Inter-
ferometer Gravitational-Wave Observatory), operated by Caltech
and MIT, has been acclaimed as conﬁrming Einstein's prediction a
century ago that gravitational waves propagating as ripples in
spacetime would be detected. The detection is cited as evidence in
favor of general relativity. This paperwill not question the detection
itself, but rather, will investigate how the LIGO data and methods
can best be used as a platform for future scientiﬁc investigation and
inference. The method will be to analyze whether the framework
proposed for analysis of the theory demonstrates that the theory of
general relativity (GR) was tested by the data and inferences from
it, which is distinct from the claim that the observations can be
shown to conﬁrm the theory.
The paper builds on two strands of research, one scientiﬁc and
one philosophical. The scientiﬁc resource is recent work by Nicolas
Yunes and Frans Pretorius, on a certain framework of assumptions
that they see as encoded in the current methods of gravitational
wave astronomy (Yunes & Pretorius, 2009). In a later paper, Yunes,
Kent Yagi, and Pretorius refer to Karl Popper as the motivation for
their approach:
The social scientist and epistemologist Popper argued that sci-
entists can never truly “prove” that a theory is correct, but rather
all we can do is disprove, or more accurately constrain, alter-
native hypotheses. The theory that remains and cannot be dis-
proven by observations becomes the status quo. Indeed, this was
the case for Newtonian gravity before the 1900s, and it is the
case today for Einstein's theory of general relativity (GR). The
latter has been subjected to a battery of tests through Solar
System, binary pulsar and cosmological observations, with no
signs of failure. These tests, however, cannot effectively probe
the extreme gravity regime: where the gravitational ﬁeld isPlease cite this article as: Patton, L., Expanding theory testing in genera
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and where characteristic velocities are comparable to the speed
of light. The [LIGO results] allow for just that (Yunes, Yagi, &
Pretorius, 2016, pp. 084002e1 and 084002e2).
In what follows, I will argue that Yunes & Pretorius, 2009 and
Yunes et al., 2016, in providing a scientiﬁc analysis of the LIGO re-
sults with respect to theory testing, go well beyond Popperian
falsiﬁcation. They provide a method for showing how a theory can
become the node of a broader network for heuristic testing. They
build a theorywithin the theory of GR, a parametrized set of models
that allow for more rigorous testing of hypotheses about deviations
from the theory's predictions and structure.
The philosophical discussion focuses on Yunes's and Pretorius's
construction of a family of related theories, generated by modeling
consequences of, and deviations from, fundamental assumptions.
The paper traces a tradition, with beginnings in the work of Rudolf
Carnap and Carl Hempel, of considering scientiﬁc formal reasoning
as constructing a network of embedded formal languages. These
languages reﬂect observational vocabularies, methods of testing,
purely mathematical reasoning, and even conventional speciﬁca-
tion of laws of nature. Analysis of formal languages shows how they
function, in practice, to allow for narrower or broader analysis of
data: e.g., by conﬁrming or falsifying a background theory, or by
constraining the values of variables and the reach of laws. When
used as a framework for testing, specifying the formal vocabulary of
theories and deﬁning families of theories under consideration al-
lows for rival theories to be compared and for some to be discarded.
In keeping with this special issue on the work of Howard Stein, I
focus on Stein's analysis of the role of axiomatic, formal reasoning
in theory development and testing. Stein advised us to “get the
laboratory inside the theory” (Stein, 1994, p. 638; Curiel, 2020).
Moreover, he, like Hempel, thought that observational and theo-
retical vocabularies were preserved within successive theories. I
take inspiration from his analysis of internal theoretical relation-
ships as being the basis for showing how a theory can be tested
more rigorously, and can be compared to rivals.
The conclusions I will draw are simple: that internal, formal
reasoning paradoxically can broaden a theory's empirical reach,
and that it can do so by removing barriers to broader empirical
testing that have been encoded into a theory's formal structure.
Barriers can include relations constructed to aid in conﬁrmation,
like constraints on parameter values, methods for modeling and
simulation, and linkages betweenmeasurement and inference, that
narrow a theory's scope for testing in practice. The sections above
have evaluated one philosophical approach to these questions,
found in Carnap, Hempel, and Stein. The sections following will
focus on the recent LIGO results, and on the analysis of them by
Yunes, Yagi, and Pretorius. I will argue that Pretorius, Yagi, and
Yunes provide an analysis very well suited to the Carnap-Stein
framework for testing.2.1. Template-based searches in gravitational astronomy: modeling
physical parameters
Multi-messenger astronomy is the search for signals from as-
tronomical events by usingmultiple sites of detection, searching for
signals from a target system and some other source: neutrinos, for
instance.12Using multiple sources allows for triangulation of the
signal, and, in other ways, improves inferences from data. A most
striking feature of multi-messenger astronomy, when working onl relativity: LIGO and parametrized theories, Studies in History and
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mathematical structure is necessary to conﬁrm a detection of a
compact binary coalescence (CBC): in this case, a pair of merging
black holes.
The data emerging from advanced LIGO (Laser Interferometer
Gravitational-Wave Observatory) techniques are differences in the
lengths of an interferometer's ‘arms', which in the case of the aLIGO
(advanced LIGO) projects currently running in Hanford, Washing-
ton, and Livingston, Louisiana, are 2 km long laser paths in a vac-
uum. (Advanced LIGO or aLIGO is so called to distinguish it from
“Initial Ligo” or iLIGO, involving an earlier, less sensitive generation
of detectors.) Based on hypotheses about the polarization of grav-
itational waves hitting the interferometer, physicists infer the plus
and cross polarizations of the waveforms. Template banks are
generated using estimates of the physical parameters of the black
holes, including their mass and spin, the chirp mass, as well as
parameters of the compact binary coalescence (CBC), including the
frequency and period of the black holes' orbit around each other
(orbital frequency and orbital period).
There are three stages to a black hole merger: inspiral, in which
the black holes come within each others' gravitational ﬁelds and
begin to spin around each other more and more quickly; merger, in
which the black holes coalesce; and ringdown, in which the black
holes have merged and the dynamics are now approximately those
of one body.13 Einstein's ﬁeld equations for general relativity cannot
be solved analytically in the inspiral and merger stages.
Nonetheless,
The inspiral phase can bemodeled very well by the restricted PN
approximation… In this approximation, the amplitude of the
time-series is assumed to vary slowly relative to the phase,
allowing its Fourier transform to be calculated via the
stationary-phase approximation (Yunes & Pretorius, 2009, pp.
122003e6).
The “restricted PN approximation” is the restricted post-
Newtonian approximation, “an umbrella term for updating New-
ton's equations perturbatively using a variety of series expansions,
most notably with respect to the dimensionless source velocity vc”
(Holst, Sarbach, Tiglio, & Vallisneri, 2016, p. 520).
The merger phase is much more difﬁcult, as it “cannot be
modeled analytically by any controlled perturbation scheme”
(Yunes & Pretorius, 2009, pp. 122003e7). The key here is that the
merger phase not only cannot be derived as a direct solution to the
ﬁeld equations of general relativity, it cannot be modeled as a
perturbation of knownwaveforms, for instance, damped sinusoids.
Yunes and Pretorius, the latter of whom made signiﬁcant earlier
breakthroughs in the ability to provide numerical relativity solu-
tions to the ﬁeld equations (Holst et al., 2016, pp. 524, 542), suggest
modeling the merger phase as an interpolation between the
inspiral and ringdown (Yunes & Pretorius, 2009, pp. 122003e7).
The ﬁeld equations of general relativity cannot be solved directly
in the dynamical, strong-ﬁeld region of gravity. More than that,
observations in the dynamical strong-ﬁeld region have been lack-
ing to date (Yunes & Pretorius, 2009, pp. 122003e2). But there has13 “We divide the coalescence into three stages: (i) the inspiral; (ii) the plunge and
merger; (iii) the ringdown. In the ﬁrst stage, the objects start widely separated and
slowly spiral in via GW radiation-reaction. In the second stage, the objects rapidly
plunge and merge, roughly when the object's separation is somewhere around the
location of the light ring. In the third stage, after a common apparent horizon has
formed, the remnant rings down and settles to an equilibrium conﬁguration. Note
that this classiﬁcation is somewhat fuzzy, as studies of numerical simulation results
have shown that a sharp transition does not exist between them in GR” (Yunes &
Pretorius, 2009, pp. 122003e6).
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1974, when
Russell Hulse and Joseph Taylor Jr. discovered the binary pulsar
PSR B1913 þ 16, whose orbit was later shown by Taylor and Joel
Weisberg to shrink in remarkable agreement with the emission
of gravitational radiation, as predicted by Einstein's quadrupole
formula. This discovery, which led to a Nobel Prize in Physics in
1993 for Hulse and Taylor, was the ﬁrst clear if indirect
demonstration of the existence of [gravitational waves]. In fact,
the precise timing analysis of PSR B1913 þ 16 (and of other
similar pulsars) reﬂects and demonstrates a broader range of
general-relativistic corrections, which are computed in the
post  Newtonian approximation (Holst et al., 2016, p. 520).
Bolstered by the success of Hulse and Taylor, early researchers in
gravitational wave astronomy, including Pretorius, Rainer Weiss,
Kip Thorne, Robert Wald, Yvonne Choquet-Brouhat, and others,
undertook to show how interferometer data could be shown to
constitute a detection of waveforms emanating frommerging black
holes.
As the BHs get closer to each other and their velocities increase,
the accuracy of the PN expansion degrades, and eventually the
full solution of Einstein's equations is needed to accurately
describe the binary evolution. This is accomplished using nu-
merical relativity (NR) which, after the initial breakthrough, has
been improved continuously to achieve the sophistication of
modeling needed for our purposes. The details of the merger
and ringdown are primarily governed by the mass and spin of
the ﬁnal BH [black hole]. In particular, the ﬁnal mass and spin
determine the (constant) frequency and decay time of the BH's
ringdown to its ﬁnal state. The late stage of the coalescence
allows us to measure the total mass which, combined with the
measurement of the chirp mass and mass-ratio from the early
inspiral, yields estimates of the individual component masses
for the binary (Abbott et al. (2016)).
The quadrupole formula, the chirp mass, and the non-constant
orbital period of the black hole mergers under analysis cemented
the use of gravitational wave observations as conﬁrmation of
general relativity. The “chirp mass” is modeled by an equation
modeling the falloff inmass as massenergy radiates from a compact
binary coalescence. The “orbital period” of a binary black hole
system is the time it takes one black hole to complete an orbit about
the other. If Newton's theory were correct, the orbital period would
be constant. A waveform from which one can estimate, and then
conﬁrm, a non-constant orbital period rules out Newtonian gravity,
and is consistent with general relativity.
Those studying black hole dynamics have developed multiple
methods of conﬁrming detections of black holes using interfer-
ometer data. Simulated waveforms using estimates of the system
parameters are used to construct a signal space covered by a
minimal set of candidate waveforms, after which the candidate
waveforms are used for matched ﬁltering.14 It took decades of labor
for the process described in the last sentence to be made possible.
The mathematical progress made, summarized in Holst et al., 2016,
has allowed for the merger phase to be modeled using a combi-
nation of analytical methods (solutions of the Einstein-Hilbert
equations) and numerical relativity or 3 þ 1 methods (see Abbott
et al., 2016).14 See, e.g., Capano et al., 2016. My thanks to Zachary Shifrel for pointing out this
paper.
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of a waveform: one that would emanate from a black hole coales-
cence with speciﬁc system parameters. Some of the parameters
turn out to be more fundamental to the generation of the simulated
waveform than others. For instance, the mass and spin of the ﬁnal
single black hole largely determine the and decay time from the
merger to the ringdown phase.
The chirpmass of the binary drives the simulation of the inspiral
phase. As Yunes and Pretorius note, the merger can be treated as an
‘interpolation’ between the inspiral and ringdown. The ringdown
phase is modeled using ‘quasi-normal modes’ or damped sinusoids,
which are understood fromobservations of the radiation of neutron
stars.15 But the inspiral is a different story: “the phase evolution [of
the inspiral phase] is driven by a particular combination of the two
masses, commonly called the chirp mass” (Abbott et al. (2016), pp.
241102e3). The chirp mass equation describes the diminution of
themass of the system over time, asmassenergy is radiated away as
gravitational waves:16
M ¼ðm1m2Þ
3
5
M
1
5
In this equation,m1 andm2 are the masses of the black holes, M
is the total mass, and M is the chirp mass. In time, the chirp mass is
estimated by the following equation:
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Here, f is the gravitational wave frequency and _f is its derivative
with respect to time (Abbott et al., 2016, pp. 241102e3).
The template banks for LIGO require specifying an estimated
chirp mass ahead of time. It is one of the fundamental parameters
of binary black hole systems, and one of the subset of the physical
parameters that drive the ﬁnal waveform (Abbott et al. (2016), pp.
241102e3). The chirp mass equation is solved in part by estimating
the mass of the black holes and the frequency of the waves hitting
the detector.
Given the aLIGO methodology, it is crucial to distinguish two
sets of parameters. The ﬁrst are the
hypothetical physical parameters that are used to construct a
simulated numerical relativity (NR) waveform. The second are the
estimated physical parameters that are inferred from thewaveform
that is selected as the best conﬁrmed from the template bank: that
is, the detected waveform. The LIGO collaboration does not use
these terms, but they are useful to distinguish them from each
other in characterizing the methods used.15 “Practically every stellar object oscillates radially or nonradially, and although
there is great difﬁculty in observing such oscillations there are already results for
various types of stars (O, B, …). All these types of pulsations of normal main
sequence stars can be studied via Newtonian theory and they are of no importance
for the forthcoming era of gravitational wave astronomy. The gravitational waves
emitted by these stars are extremely weak and have very low frequencies… This is
not the case when we consider very compact stellar objects i.e. neutron stars and
black holes. Their oscillations, produced mainly during the formation phase, can be
strong enough to be detected by the gravitational wave detectors (LIGO, VIRGO,
GEO600, SPHERE) which are under construction. In the framework of general rel-
ativity (GR) quasi-normal modes (QNM) arise, as perturbations (electromagnetic or
gravitational) of stellar or black hole spacetimes. Due to the emission of gravita-
tional waves there are no normal mode oscillations but instead the frequencies
become ‘quasi-normal’ (complex), with the real part representing the actual fre-
quency of the oscillation and the imaginary part representing the damping”
(Kokkotas and Schmidt 1999; Introduction).
16 See equation (3) of Abbott et al., 2016, p. 241102e3, for a more detailed version.
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the ﬁrst aLIGO detection, GW150914. These estimates can be given
a complex set of constraints, including: theoretical constraints
(from GR, Hamiltonian mechanics, and Fourier analysis, for
instance); physical constraints (e.g., from knowledge about neutron
star binaries); and empirical limits derived from the properties of
the detected waveform. The latter constraints are determined by
Bayesian analysis of the conﬁdence interval within which the
detection can be conﬁrmed.
The hypothetical physical parameters used to derive candidate
waveforms from the template bank are used in physical reasoning:
with GR, and with the post-Newtonian approximation and the
quadrupole formula. That physical reasoning is used to simulate
binary black hole systems and to construct hypothetical waveforms
that might be detected as emanating from systems with speciﬁc
physical parameters. When a single waveform is selected for
conﬁrmation from the template bank based on the data, the like-
lihood ratio is used to conﬁrm that waveform as evidence for the
detection of a system with those speciﬁc physical parameters.
Estimating the physical parameters of a system is done in post-
data analysis, using admirably open source, customized methods
for the LIGO collaboration (Abbott et al., 2016, e.g.). There are
ongoing projects investigating the possible effects of “systematic”
errors on the resulting analysis, whether theoretical or statistical.17
These projects are conceived as part of the collective work of the
LIGO collaboration. These projects do not focus on the possible
structural assumptions encoded in the models that have to do with
the dynamics of GR, or with assumptions about the time-
dependent variation of the chirp mass, for instance.
The proccess of ﬁnding candidate waveforms to conﬁrm with
respect to the data is freighted with theoretical assumptions - by
design. Moreover, the assumptions about the time-dependent dy-
namics of the system are co-variant. The “chirp mass”, a time-
dependent massenergy function, is a case in point. Building a
candidate (hypothetical) waveform requires providing varying hy-
pothetical physical values for the variables involved. Once a
candidate waveform is identiﬁed as the most likely in post-data
analysis, the chirp mass of the system is now considered a
physical parameter of that system. This allows researchers to treat
the chirp mass as a “parameter” that can be estimated using the
interferometer data. But the chirp mass was not measured directly
in that initial process. It is used as one of a number of hypothetical
physical parameters in constructing a set of candidate waveforms,
and then it is conﬁrmed, along with all the other hypothetical pa-
rameters, when the candidate waveform is judged the most likely.
The chirpmass function is co-variant with physical variables like
the initial masses of the two black holes (or other astronomical
bodies) and with the ﬁnal, single mass post-merger, in the ring-
down phase. And the chirp mass function has a very signiﬁcant,
almost dominant effect on the amplitudes of the waveforms (see,
e.g, Thorne, 1997, p. 14). This has led to the perception that one can
“read off” the chirp mass from the detected waveform. Of course, to
read off these features from the waveform, one has to get to the
accurate waveform ﬁrst!
Getting to the accurate waveforms is done, now, in a process
that includes matched ﬁltering that depends on a template bank of
candidate waveforms, all of which are produced using hypothetical
assumptions about the chirp mass and other parameters and
functions, and assumptions about the dynamics of the system of
which these elements are descriptions. If the aim is to test general
relativity, in the context of rival theories and of other theories as yet17 Abbott et al. (2016), Ghosh, Del Pozzo, and Ajith (2016), and others. I am
grateful to Heta Patel for informing me of Ghosh's work.
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this section, we have focused on how substantive, hypothetical
physical parameters are embedded in the modeling and simulation
methods of aLIGO. In the section following, we will see how how
assumptions about GR itself are “baked in” to the templates and
inferences in model-based template searches. For a more robust
testing framework for aLIGO to be built requires analysis of how
these assumptions can be made ‘generic’, in Curiel's sense: for
instance, so that they deﬁne a class of structures that can be tested
to determine which of the candidate set is conﬁrmed by the
observations.
2.2. The parametrized post-Einsteinian framework
Frans Pretorius and Yvonne Choquet-Brouhat were among those
whose work allowed for the links between numerical relativity
methods and solutions to the linearized ﬁeld equations to be con-
structed. More recently, a paper by Yunes and Pretorius (2009)
argues that the very methods that Pretorius participated in con-
structing encode what Yunes and Pretorius call “fundamental
theoretical bias”, which they contrast with “modeling bias”.18 A
modeling bias might include the choice to model a ﬂuid as
continuous rather than granular, for instance, or to make the usual
simplifying assumptions. In the case of the dynamics of astro-
nomical binary systems (e.g. orbiting black holes or neutron stars),
a modeling bias is a case “where the preconception relates to
physical assumptions to simplify the solutions considered (e.g. that
all binaries have circularized prior to merger), or unveriﬁed as-
sumptions about the accuracy of the solution used to model the
given event” (Yunes & Pretorius, 2009, pp. 122003e1). Modeling
bias arises in any number of situations in physics and is well
known.19
The “fundamental bias” analyzed by Yunes and Pretorius is more
speciﬁc: in the case of general relativity, it is the assumption that
the Einstein ﬁeld equations are valid in the strong-ﬁeld regime
(Yunes & Pretorius, 2009, pp. 122003e1). They note:
Systematic errors created by fundamental bias may be as large
as, if not larger than, those induced by modeling bias, as
waveforms could deviate from the GR [general relativity] pre-
diction dramatically in the dynamical strong ﬁeld, if GR does not
adequately describe the system in that region. This is particu-
larly worrisome for template-based searches, as the event that
will be ascribed to a detection will be the member of the tem-
plate bankwith the largest SNR [signal to noise ratio]. Given that
GR is quite well tested in certain regimes, many sources cannot
have deviations so far from GR as to prevent detection with GR
templates (albeit with lower SNR). Thus, if templates are used
based solely on GR models, although the corresponding events
may be “heard,” any unexpected information the signals may
contain about the nature of gravity will be ﬁltered out (Yunes
and Pretorius (2009), pp. 122003e1).
A template-based search uses matched ﬁltering to select the
best candidate waveform from a signal space that's been covered
ahead of time with a minimal set of possible waveforms generated18 That fact should alert us that the term ‘bias' is being used here to mean ‘de-
viation resulting from an assumption or structural feature’, which is not necessarily
negative.
19 The use of hypothetical physical parameters in template-based modeling could
be seen as a kind of modeling bias, or not, depending on how you see the methods
and conclusions unfolding in practice.
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estimated values for the parameters of the source. The worrying
possibility is that an event with a signal to noise ratio that's picked
up by the template based search will be close to the predictions of
general relativity, but the ways in which it deviates from GR will be
masked by the templates themselves.
Two questions motivate Yunes's and Pretorius's approach:
1. Suppose gravity is described by a theory differing fromGR in the
dynamical, strong-ﬁeld regime, but one observes a population of
merger events ﬁltered through a GR template bank. What kinds
of systematic errors and incorrect conclusions might be drawn
about the nature of the compact object population due to this
fundamental bias?
2. Given a set of observations of merger events obtained with a GR
template bank, can one quantify or constrain the level of con-
sistency of these observations with GR as the underlying theory
describing these events? (Yunes and Pretorius (2009), pp.
122003e3).
We might wish to see what Yunes and Pretorius call a “funda-
mental theoretical bias” as a framework of assumptions, applied to
modeling.20 If the entire modeling framework you have con-
structed is not suitable for testing a theory, but only for conﬁrming
it, then you are not putting the claims of the background theory in
any jeopardy. You may then ﬁnd that the observations you've made
are consistent with the theory, but have not controlled for certain
types of error. The question is of the epistemic foundation for
accepting or rejecting the model that you have used. Do you have
justiﬁcation for the claim that the hypotheses of the model are
properly independent of the background assumptions of the theory
under testing, or not?
Testing requires constructing a framework under which we can
show whether the hypotheses of a model are independent of, or
dependent on, the theory under test. The framework I advocate
allows for the construction of a more robust framework for testing
through formal reasoning. We can identify distinct observational,
theoretical, and “pre-theoretical” languages within a theory, all of
which can be analyzed as logically dependent on or independent of
the others. In particular, we might be able to construct formal
languages within a theory speciﬁcally for the purposes of testing,
and for the purpose of showing which of the assumptions of a
theory are independent of the others and can therefore be a strong
basis for empirical testing.
Yunes and Pretorius propose a “parametrized post-Einsteinian
(ppE) framework” along these lines.21 LIGO astronomy is based
on the assumption that “a compact object such as a BH [black hole]
or NS [neutron star] spiraling into a supermassive BH will emit
waves that carry a map of the gravitational ﬁeld of the central BH”
(Yunes and Pretorius (2009), pp. 122003e2). That map is partly
drawn by investigating the polarization of the signal, which is
similar to investigating the E and B ﬁelds by determining theChapter 3 of (Will, 2014) provides a detailed examination of GR as a “purely
dynamical metric theory of gravity”, meaning a metric theory “whose gravitational
ﬁelds have their structure and evolution determined by coupled partial differential
ﬁeld equations” (Will, 2014, x3.1.2). Will analyzes the differences between GR,
Brans-Dicke theory, and Visser's bimetric massive gravity theory in terms of
whether each is a “purely dynamical metric theory” or a “prior-geometric metric
theory”. The PPN formalism, ﬁrst presented in uniﬁed form by Nordtvedt and Will,
is laid out in x3.2, and in x3.3, Will explains how the PPN formalism can be applied
in “the comparison and classiﬁcation of alternative metric theories of gravity”. For
the relation between the PPN and ppE formalisms, see Yunes & Pretorius, 2009, pp.
122003e3.
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‘cross’ polarizations of gravitational waves.
LIGO astronomy is done in part by relating properties of the
signal to estimated properties of the source (see, e.g., Abbott et al.,
2016). Properties of the signal including frequency, polarization,
and strength can be taken to indicate properties (parameters) of the
black hole system, including the mass of the component black
holes, the chirp mass of the system, the orbital frequency and
period of the system, the distance of the merger from the detector,
the position of the merger in spacetime, and so on.
But as Yunes and Pretorius observe, the process of reasoning
about system parameters using LIGO data is freighted with as-
sumptions. The template banks that LIGO uses involve techniques
including post-Newtonian approximation, the quadrupole formula,
and numerical relativity that bake GR into the predicted waveform
(see, e.g., Capano, Harry, Privitera, and Buonanno (2016)). Even
though there is no direct solution of the linearized Einstein ﬁeld
equations in the strong ﬁeld regime, those equations are used as
formal constraints on many of the templates that are used to
conﬁrm parameter estimations in LIGO astronomy. If the theoret-
ical assumptions from GR are incorrect as descriptions of the
detected system, then the signal will still be detected, but the
conclusions drawn from it will be inaccurate. For instance, a signal
might be detected but parsed as a weak signal using the current
templates, and as a result the systemmight be inferred to be distant
from the detector. But if the signal is in fact a strong signal
that is inconsistent with GR, it may be much closer. Yunes and
Pretorius observe that such a case is a real possibility given the
assumptions made in template-based searches.
It is not trivial to remove the assumptions from the templates.
As explained above, LIGO data consists of measurements of differ-
ential lengths of interferometer arms, indexed to time. The ex-
pected noise must be modeled and subtracted from the signal. In
Hanford, Washington, where one detector is located, noise ranging
from seismic vibrations due to logging trucks to shot noise from
quantum effects may complicate the signal. Once a maximally
‘clean’ signal is obtained, a search is performed using templates
covering the expected signal space. One search looks simply for a
signal ‘burst’ picked up by multiple detectors, while another
template-based search looks for a waveform with certain expected
parameters. In the case of the landmark ﬁrst detection, GW150914,
“Two types of searches found this event: an unmodeled search
designed to look for coherent “bursts” of power in both LIGO de-
tectors and a modeled search designed to search for gravitational
waves (GWs) from coalescing binary neutron stars (BNS), neutron-
star black hole binaries (NSBH), and binary black holes (BBH)”
(Capano et al. (2016), pp. 124007e1).22An unmodeled search can
detect a signal, but does not have the sensitivity to show whether
that signal is consistent with a waveform that would be predicted
to emanate from a system with speciﬁc parameters. Modeled
searches using template banks are preferable, then, in order to22 “The primary difference between these searches is that the modeled search
uses a bank of template waveforms of expected signals to match ﬁlter the data,
obtaining a signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) for candidate events … Key to maximizing
the sensitivity of the modeled search is that the parameters of the template
waveforms are sufﬁciently close to the sources' parameters such that the
morphology of waveforms matches that of signals. Any mismatch between signal
and template leads to a loss in SNR, and down-weighting by the signal-based
vetoes. Some source parameters, such as the coalescence time and phase, can be
analytically maximized over, resulting in essentially no SNR loss. The remaining
parameters, however, are traditionally covered by some gridding of the parameter
space, in which a small but nonzero amount of SNR is lost to signals from systems
not lying exactly on the grid” (Capano et al. (2016), pp. 124007e1).
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speciﬁc properties (Capano et al. (2016); Abbott et al., 2016).
The argument of Yunes and Pretorius is that the current
framework for modeled searches contains structural features that
effectively build the assumption that GR is correct into themodeled
search and conﬁrmation process. The more sensitive and speciﬁc
the template-based search is, the more assumptions the method
will embody. The very method that contributes to the signiﬁcance
of the results of the search - what makes it a ﬁve sigma result - may
be masking information about gravitational waves and their sour-
ces that is inconsistent with the background theory of general
relativity.2.3. The parametrized post-Einsteinian framework
The parametrized post-Einsteinian (ppE) framework was
devised to resolve this problem. It is intended to be close enough to
GR to be able to analyze the data properly, but at the same time to
be able to “measure generic deviations from GR predictions” (Yunes
and Pretorius (2009), pp. 122003e3). Note the similarity between
this terminology and Curiel's distinction between “abstract”
equations, “generic” physical systems, and “concrete” and “indi-
vidual” models (Curiel, 2020, x7). Yunes and Pretorius identify a
class of physical systems determinable as “modiﬁcations to GR” in
the late merger stages. They begin by analyzing which claims of GR
can be considered valid constraints on theories in the neighbor-
hood, and identifying those structural elements of the theory
where “generic deviations” from it may be detectable. They reason,
starting with GR binary BHmerger waveforms seems sound.We
are then faced with the question of how to modify these
waveforms in a sensible manner. In theory, there are uncount-
ably many conceivable modiﬁcations to GR that only manifest in
the late stages of themerger. To make this questionmanageable,
we shall guide our search for ppE expansions by looking to
alternative theories that satisfy as many of the following criteria
as possible: (i) Metric theories of gravity: theories where
gravity is a manifestation of curved spacetime, described via a
metric tensor, and which satisﬁes the weak equivalence prin-
ciple. (ii) Weak field consistency: theories that reduce to GR
sufﬁciently when gravitational ﬁelds are weak and velocities are
small, i.e. to pass all precision, experimental, and observational
tests. (iii) Strong field inconsistency: theories that modify GR
in the dynamical strong ﬁeld by a sufﬁcient amount to observ-
ably affect binary merger waveforms (Yunes and Pretorius
(2009), pp. 122003e2).
The idea is to build a framework within GR that is able to detect
deviations from GR's predictions in the strong-ﬁeld regime. The
framework is complex and involves a number of extensions and
modiﬁcations to the methods for analysis of LIGO data.
Perhaps themost signiﬁcant observation for our purposes is that
the ppE framework was designed for post-detection data analysis,
not for detection or search.23 The framework is intended as a
network of relations within the theory that nonetheless allow for
information that is in conﬂict with the theory to be observed.
The term “parametrized” does not mean, exactly, that the
framework has to do with parameters of the source system (mass,
spin, and so on). The term should be understood, instead, in the23 “We do not propose here to employ the ppE templates for direct detection, but
rather for post-detection analysis. Following the detection of a GW by a pure GR
template, that segment of data could then be reanalyzed with the ppE templates”
(Yunes & Pretorius, 2009, pp. 122003e5).
l relativity: LIGO and parametrized theories, Studies in History and
1
L. Patton / Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics xxx (xxxx) xxx10sense of “parametrized” models in statistics, in which substantive
variables are replaced with parameters so that the range of the
parameters become the focus of the analysis. Some ppE parameters
are physical parameters (the chirp mass), but some are intended to
measure speciﬁc assumptions of the model. For instance, in the
merger and ringdown phase, Yunes and Pretorius introduce con-
stant parameters that are “set by continuity” - that is, their pre-
dicted value is set by the assumption that the waveform will be
continuous in these phases (Yunes and Pretorius (2009), pp.
122003e4). This move is akin to what Curiel describes as moving
from the abstract equations to a family or “species” of physical
systems. Other parameters are set by the assumption that, for
instance, the motion of a system element is well described by a
known analytic function. The point of “setting” parameters in this
way is to generate predicted, hypothetical waveforms. These hy-
pothetical waveforms can then be used in post-data analysis to
detect deviations from theoretical assumptions and predictions -
even fundamental errors about the phenomena being investigated.
These parameters of the ppE framework could be called
“descriptive parameters”, to distinguish them from the physical
parameters discussed in the section above. The reason to use
descriptive parametrization of the GR equations, as Yunes and
Pretorius do, is to obtain control of the counterfactuals: for
instance, “If the merger is continuous, then the waveformwill have
the following form” (given certain other assumptions). Those
counterfactuals are crucial to testing for deviations from a theory's
predictions, which is a different process from confirming those
predictions.
The parametrization of the equations used for detection and
simulation of waveforms is key to the ppE framework. GR makes
predictions about the values - and the ranges of values - for certain
variables. The parametrized equations replace the variables with
parameters, which puts the focus on questions like the dependence
of parameters on others within the system, and the structure of the
dynamics of the system. In some cases, the dynamics is reduced
almost entirely to kinematic structure and then the dynamics of GR
is re-introduced as a special case.24
Yunes and Pretorius provide an anatomy of a binary black hole
coalescence, including GR basedmodels of the inspiral, merger, and
ringdown phases of the coalescence. Following this, they introduce
modiﬁcations to the fundamental equations used in LIGO de-
tections and template building. One might ask why Yunes and
Pretorius would begin with models in GR, since they are proposing
a kind of formal language that is broader than GR. The reason they
do so, I believe, is that their presentation focuses on how the parts
of the GR formalism are related to each other. Parametrized models
allow for relationships between formal elements of the theory to be
made more apparent, and Yunes and Pretorius use this to good
effect in modeling the conservative and dissipative dynamics of
black hole mergers. The ﬁrst GR model they consider consists of
“modiﬁcations of the Fourier transform of the response function
during the inspiral arising either from changes to the conserved
binary binding energy (the Hamiltonian …), or changes to the en-
ergy balance law. The former are essentially modiﬁcations to the
conservative dynamics, while the latter modiﬁes the dissipative
dynamics” (Yunes & Pretorius, 2009, pp. 122003e8).
In this section (IIIA), Yunes and Pretorius focus on how the
conservative and dissipative dynamics are derived from the binary
Hamiltonian and fromKepler's law, in the former case, and from the
balance law and the perturbation of the stress-energy tensor, in the
second case. They go on to perform similar modeling tasks for the24 See Curiel (draft) for discussion of the relationship between kinematics and
dynamics in the structure of spacetime theories.
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zation that is consistent with the GR modiﬁcations to classical
mechanics. But they do more than this:
1 In several cases, they allow for the replacement of a speciﬁc GR
formalism with an analytical expression in terms of a known
function, which allows for a “generic” statement of the equation
that's in play (e.g., Yunes & Pretorius, 2009, pp. 122003e8).
2 In the case of their modiﬁcations to the conservative dynamics
in the inspiral phase, they provide a generic parametrization
that encodes only the predictions from the Hamiltonian and
Kepler's law - but then they allow for the GR and post-
Newtonian predictions to be recovered within that formalism,
by constraining the values of the parameters, for instance
(Yunes & Pretorius, 2009, pp. 122003e9).
The theoretical language and substantive predictions of GR are
being replaced with more general formalisms that appeal to known
functions that can be inverted, that replace variables with param-
eters, and, in general, that replace the GR strong-ﬁeld equations
and structure with a broader scaffolding for rigorous post-data
testing. Once key equations are replaced with their parametrized
forms, the ppE framework can be put together as awhole. The main
virtue of using this framework is that, if it is used for post-detection
data analysis, ideally it would catch the cases of interest to Yunes
and Pretorius: the cases in which a detection is made but the data
contain information inconsistent with GR. Patel (2019), for
instance, provides a recent set of computational methods for post-
data analysis using the ppE formalism.
Hempel is right that, if we switch between theories in physics by
interchanging the observables and leaving only uninterpreted
theoretical terms and symbols, we may not preserve the empirical
knowledge and tacit knowledge encoded in those physical theories.
But Carnap, Hilbert, and Curiel are also right that terms with a
speciﬁc role or place in a structure - like Hooke's constant or the
terms ‘line’ and ‘plane’ in geometry - can be made abstract by
turning the theory itself into a “generic structure” with multiple
possible manifestations. The ppE method uses parameters to
construct a class of dynamical systems of just this kind. That
methods deﬁnes a class of structures, and testing can be set up to
try to ﬁnd experimental ways to decide between them.25
A closing note: Einstein likelywould have learned of all this with
pleasure. Einstein's frequently expressed wish was for the theory of
relativity to be as open to testing as possible.
3. Conﬁrmation versus testing in general relativity
The summary above of recent progress in gravitational wave
astronomy shows that, depending on the methods used, the data
from advanced LIGO research can be taken to conﬁrm, or to test,
general relativity - but the methods must be constructed carefully.
The ppE framework constructed by Yunes and Pretorius provides a
speciﬁc example of constructing a broader framework for post-data
testing, a broader framework capable of detecting ﬂaws in the
structural assumptions of the theory with respect to the observed
data.
While many would reject a strict distinction between theoret-
ical and observational vocabularies in the sense of the early Carnap,
Stein's work points to the fact that an in-practice distinction be-
tween confirmation of a theory and testing of that theory via25 Here, I should note the obvious precedent of the semantic tradition in philos-
ophy of science, exempliﬁed by Stegmüller, Sneed, Suppes, and perhaps Hesse, and
with precursors including Hertz and Hilbert.
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and Meaning”,
a sentence may be conﬁrmable without being testable; e.g. if we
know that our observation of such and such a course of events
would conﬁrm the sentence, and such and such a different
course would conﬁrm its negation without knowing how to set
up either this or that observation (Carnap, 1936, pp. 420e421).
General relativity has been verywell conﬁrmed, in theweak and
now in the strong ﬁeld regimes. Testing is a very different matter. In
the case of advanced LIGO, the need for analysis of the theory
before further testing is great. The “observations” of gravitational
wave astronomy require so much theoretical structure to formulate
that the theory must be re-formulated for tests to detect, not only
deviations from the theory's predictions, but information that ob-
servations made using the theory will obscure.
It is not possible to provide a universal theoretical language to
relate GR to LIGO observations. Thus, there is no ready-made
framework for testing - which is entirely distinct from whether
there is a way to test whether a given set of observations can be
warranted to be a conﬁrmation of GR using the likelihood function.
Just because there is no ready-made framework, however, does not
mean that there cannot be a framework that is constructed within
the theory itself. The joint testing of the classical and new quantum
theories is one example of a relation between theoretical languages
for the purposes of theory testing. Nordtvedt and Will, and then
Yunes and Pretorius, construct alternatives - the PPN and ppE
frameworks - where GR itself is turned into a framework for testing
through parametrization.
The ppE framework is the ﬁrst step toward this scaffolding for
testing, a scaffolding constructed within the theory itself, but using
parametrization and other formal methods to make the theory
more ‘generic’. Yunes and Pretorius re-formulate the models of
black hole coalescences using a “parametrized” version of the GR
equations, which allows for a descriptive parametrization, which in
turn allows for counterfactual reasoning about what thewaveforms
would look like given different formal assumptions. As a result,
using different values for the parameters and incorporating
different constraints, one can construct a more sensitive instru-
ment for the testing of the theory, out of the theory itself, which
becomes a means of determining a class or family of related the-
ories or structures.
Even before the hypotheses of the theory are tested, Yunes and
Pretorius suggest that the theory itself must be investigated to see
whether its basic assumptions about the phenomena, inﬂuenced by
a background theory, are descriptively inaccurate of the data under
investigation. The question is whether the formal assumptions of a
theory are descriptively, formally, or statistically adequate to the
data under investigation. If a researcher encodes strong assump-
tions into the entire modeling framework, the problem is not that a
speciﬁc test of a hypothesis will be ﬂawed, it is that the entire
framework used to formulate hypotheses may be misleading - and
that we do not have the tools to detect that it’s wrong until the
framework is modiﬁed.26
Yunes and Pretorius construct a set of related theories deter-
mined by distinct assumptions and by the dynamical systems they
embody. For instance, in the case of the inspiral, the conservative
energy dynamics are modeled using the Hamiltonian and Kepler's
law as the fundamental relations, and fewer assumptions are made26 See, e.g., the statistical model speciﬁcation approach found in Spanos, 2011.
Spanos & McGuirk, 2001 traces statistical model speciﬁcation to the work of R.A.
Fisher (pp. 1168e9).
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and Pretorius construct are not general relativity. But they are not
not general relativity - they are not derived from a rival theory.
Instead, key structural elements of GR are made, at the same time,
more general and more inferentially rich, in the sense that the
“generic” versions of the equations allow for multiple in-
terpretations, derived hypotheses, and empirical possibilities. In
Yunes et al. (2016), the ppE framework is used to support reasoning
about rivals to general relativity, and extensions of current theo-
rizing about gravitational waves to future detections:
Events GW150914 and GW151226 [the ﬁrst two LIGO de-
tections] are fantastic probes of theoretical physics that have
important implications for certain aspects of extreme gravity,
but unfortunately not all. Future detections of GWs from NS
[neutron star] binaries will allow us to probe different aspects of
extreme gravity. The prime examples of this are theoretical
models where gravity is described by a metric tensor with
evolution equations that differ from the Einstein equations only
through a modiﬁed “right-hand side” that depends on the
matter stress-energy tensor. Examples of such theoretical
models are Eddington-inspired Born-Infeld gravity and Palatini
f(R) theories… Other examples include the activation of certain
scalar or pseudoscalar ﬁelds in the strong-gravity regime
sourced by dense matter, such as Brans-Dicke theory, the scalar-
tensor theory extension of Damour and Esposito-Farese, and f(R)
models as they can be mapped to scalar-tensor theories (Yunes
et al., 2016, pp. 084002e29 - 084002e30).
To test the theories mentioned, ﬁrst it is necessary to establish
exactly how the theories differ formally from Einstein's equations,
and then to model what evidence for each of the theories would
look like. This may consist in the ﬁrst instance of formal reasoning
about the internal structure of the theory, before moving on to test
the hypotheses and models empirically.
Yunes and Pretorius (2009) parametrize the equations of gen-
eral relativity, and the waveform models derived from them, to
remove bias. In this way, Yunes and Pretoriusmake the theorymore
broadly empirically testable, not less. But they do so by modifying
the formal laws, principles, deﬁnitions, and models of the theory.
By parametrizing the theory elements, Yunes and Pretorius make it
possible to test the theory more rigorously using experimental
observation, and to draw more secure inferences about the extent
to which the theory has been tested. The potential of the ppE
framework remains untapped to a great degree, but is in use in
recent expositions of GR and the LIGO project.
The construction of the ppE framework does not involve any
new experimental technique, and yet it extends the experimental
reach of the theory. It does so precisely bymaking it possible to “get
the laboratory within the theory”: to engage in a priori reasoning
about the empirical reach of the theory, trying to pin down the
breaking points of theories, the regimes inwhich they are no longer
applicable, and the species (in Curiel's sense) of systems in which
they may break down. Moreover, constructing theories in which
the ‘abstract’ and ‘generic’ equations and variables of the theory are
clearly, explicitly identiﬁed, allows for a deeper understanding of
the structural relationships of that theory: which in turn allows
researchers to pinpoint even more interesting problems.
The testing method provided via the ppE framework is an
excellent reﬂection of Stein's argument that moving to Carnap's
‘ﬁrst volume’ can be a more empirically well founded move in
terms of providing a broader base for testing than gathering more
and more speciﬁc observations. If the modeling and detection
processes in gravitational wave astrophysics encode a framework ofl relativity: LIGO and parametrized theories, Studies in History and
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the more data is gathered, the farther from the correct analysis we
will be. Only by re-conceiving the fundamental relationship be-
tween the theoretical and observational vocabularies of the theory
can our observations be a true test of the theory, and indicate av-
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